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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABETH A. DESCHLER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 18035

FIREMAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE POLICY EXCLUSION WAS INTENDED TO ELIMINATE COVERAGE
FOR THIS RISK.
The principal argument posed in respondent's brief is
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover policy benefits
because the aerial navigation exclusion is ambiguous in its
intent and must therefore be construed against the defendant
insurer.

Brief of Respondent, pp. 8-9, 15.

There is nothing in the record suggesting Judge Taylor
found that the exclusion is ambiguous.

The Summary Judgment

does not specify the basis for the lower court's ruling, nor
any supporting reasoning.

The plaintiff's repeated
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references to alleged grounds and reasons for the judgment
notwithstanding, the most that can be implied from the decision of the lower court is that Judge Taylor found the water
ski kite was not a •device for aerial navigation.•

Brief of

Respondent, pp. 1, 6.
The exclusion is not ambiguous.

The plaintiff's argument

attempts to obscure the clear and specific intent of this
type of exclusion under the guise of interpretation.

General

rules of construction dictate that in the case of ambiguity,
the language is to be construed against the draftsman.

How-

ever, ambiguity is not to be presumed and the rule is not
applied simply because one party contends an alternative construction is reasonable.
[T]hat rule has no application unless there is some
genuine ambiguity or uncertainty in the language
upon which reasonable minds may differ as to the
meaning. That requirement is not satisfied because
a party may get a different meaning by placing a
forced or strained construction on it in accordance
with his interest. The test to be applied is:
would the meaning be plain to a person of ordinary
intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter
fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual
and natural meaning of the wordsl, and in the
light of existing circumstances, including the purpose of the policy. If so, a special rule of construction is obviously unnecessary.
Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Ins. co., 7 Utah 2d 336,
325 P.2d 264, 266 (1958) [Citations omitted].

Accord,

Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Barnes, 285 F.2d 299, 301
(9th Cir. 1960).
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Aviation and aerial navigation exclusions are commonly
used throughout the insurance industry.

They are drafted

with the specific intent of limiting the insurer's liability
for those extra risks of death ordinarily associated with the
dangers of aerial flight.

Green v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins.

Co., 144 F.2d 55, 57 (1st Cir. 1944).
It is no secret that insurance companies generally
seek to limit their liability under life insurance
policies for injuries or deaths resulting from the
insured's connection with certain enumerated activities. The common risks which accident and death
policies exclude are death by suicide, Couch on Insurance Second §§ 40:4, 41:195; death or disability
caused by certain diseases or infections, Id.
§ 41:398; death or injury suffered during war or
military service, Id. § 41:696; and death or injury
connected with aviation, Id. § 41:541; Annotations
at 155 A.L.R. 1026 and 17--X.L.R. 2d 1041. The average individual should not be surprised, therefore,
to find that these very same exclusions do in fact
exist in the accident coverage portion of the certificate issued to Dan Ayres [the deceased]. Included
among these common exclusions is the aviation clause
at issue in this case.
These types of provisos, which exclude aviation-related risks from coverage, are not only common, but their usual and ordinary purpose has been
characterized by the courts. . . . "[the insurance
company] intended to insure most people who fly but
not those whose profession or hobby is connected
with the actual flying of planes and who are therefore normally subject to more repeated risks and
risks more directly within their own control."
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Barnes, 285 F.2d
at 300 . • • •
Ayres v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 602 F.2d 1309, 1313
(9th Cir. 1979) [Emphasis added].
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The clear intent of the provision at issue in this case
is to exclude the dangerous risks associated with all air
travel except commercial passenger transportation.
EXCLUSIONS
The policy does not cover any loss, fatal or nonfatal caused by or resulting from (1) injuries sustained in consequence of riding as a passenger or
otherwise in any vehicle or device for aerial navigation, except as a passenger for transportation
only, and not as a pilot or crew member, in any aircraft which has been certified as airworthy by the
appropriate authority of the country of its registry
and which is not owned, leased or operated by the
Policyholder;
The exclusion is, admittedly, broad in scope.

It is in-

tended to cover all hobby or recreational airborne travel.
The exclusion could have specifically named every type of
device for aerial navigation known to man including water ski
kites.

The lack of that sort of specificity does not equate

with ambiguity.

This same argument was considered and re-

jected by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Cabell v. World
Service Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980).
In Cabell, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's
judgment in favor of the defendant insurer, finding that a
wing-type para-plane was a "vehicle or device for aerial navigation," an excluded risk.

As to the plaintiff's argument

that the exclusion was ambiguous because it failed to specifically exclude accidents involving para-planes the court
stated:
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Of course, the policy could have specifically named
every known or conceivable type of device for aerial
navigation had the company chosen to do so, but such
specificity is not necessary when the general term,
by its common and ordinary meaning, clearly includes
the device in question.
559 S.W.2d at 654. 1
Other appellate courts which have examined the exclusionary language at issue have uniformly held it to be nonambiguous.

The most recent decision in point is Edison v. Reli-

able Life Ins. Co., 664 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1981), in which
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, 495 F.Supp. 484, (discussed in appellant's opening brief at pp. 12-14).

On appeal the Ninth Circuit held

that the exclusionary language was clear and unambiguous, and
that the defendant insurer was entitled to summary judgment
since the deceased had died as a consequence of riding in a
•device for aerial navigation,• a parachute.
1132.

664 F.2d at

In finding the death was specifically excluded from

coverage by the policy terms the court of appeals declined

lThe test requires that the words be given their usual
and natural meanings. The plaintiff's argument, however,
relies on technical definitions from the Federal Aviation
Agency and other sources which, even if accepted, do not
illustrate any ambiguity. Brief of Respondent, pp. 7-8.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to •obscure the intentions of the parties to the policy under
the guise of interpretation.•

Id. at 1133.

POINT II
A WATER SKI KITE IS NOT DISTINGUISHABLE IN
OPERATION FROM PARACHUTES, HANG GLIDERS,
AND SIMILAR DEVICES SO AS TO REMOVE IT FROM
THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE POLICY EXCLUSION.
The plaintiff admits the water ski kite is used for recreational purposes, can be very dangerous to fly, and is controlled as to its movement in the air by the operator.
of Respondent, pp. 2-5.

Brief

Nevertheless, the plaintiff contends

the water ski kite is distinguishable from similar aerial
devices such as hang gliders and parachutes.
The plaintiff's attempts to distinguish the operation of
the water ski kite from other similar devices rely on inconsistent analysis.

In the lower court, the plaintiff analo-

gized the water ski kite to a parachute in purpose and
function; the plaintiff's own affidavit likens the kite to a
parachute.

[R. 49, 52].

On appeal, the plaintiff now argues

that a water ski kite is not like a parachute, but is a
•water surface device•. 2 Brief of Respondent, p. 8.

2The plaintiff makes no attempt to explain or justify
this sudden change of face. Apparently, the plaintiff now
realizes that parachute cases are regularly cited to define
•aerial devices• and •navigation• (Brief of Respondent, p.
14), and that the broad scope of the exclusionary language
forces her to take to the water to prevail.
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The plaintiff also contends that the kite is distinguishable from other similar devices on the basis that its movement does not depend upon the reaction of air currents or its
lifting surfaces.

Brief of Respondent, p. 8.

That statement

is not supported in the record, and is contrary to the affidavit of Lynn Webb, manufacturer of the kite, which is a part
of the record.

[R. 31-33].

The operation of the water ski kite is not distinguishable from parachutes, hang gliders and similar devices in any
meaningful way which would justify placing the kite outside
the parameters of the policy exclusion and its intended purpose.

The risk sought to be excluded, recreational airborne

travel, is the same for all of these devices.

Notwithstand-

ing the plaintiff's appellation, the kite does not operate on
the water surface but in the air.
vertical sail.

The kite has no fins or

Its user must contend with birds, air cur-

rents and low-lying clouds, not fish, whitecaps and motorboat
wakes.

The kite is a •water surface device• used 50 feet

above the water surface.

Its operation is identical to a

parachute or glider once the tow rope is disconnected.

The

boat does not control the kites maneuverability in the air,
but simply extends its speed and range of travel.
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The dangers associated with sport kiting, hang gliding,
parachuting and similar activities are well known.

The in-

surance risk attendant upon such activities is the same.

It

is not reasonable that an average person familiar with these
sports would view them as so distinguishable that the exclusionary language affects risks attendant upon one activity
but not another, nor that the exclusionary language was intended to apply only to mechanical contrivances such as privately piloted airplanes and not to these non-mechanized devices.

The clear purpose and intent of the policy language

is otherwise.
CONCLUSION
There is not a single reported decision anywhere in the
country supporting the plaintiff's argument that the policy
exclusion at issue is ambiguous.

Similarly, no basis or

authority exists for distinguishing the operation of the
water ski kite from parachutes, hang gliders and similar
devices, with respect to the intended coverage and purpose of
the aerial navigation exclusion.
The intent of the policy exclusion is to eliminate from
coverage the extra risks of death normally associated with
the dangers of all aerial flight other than commercial transportation.

The scope of the exclusion is, intentionally,
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very broad.
case.

That fact, however, has no bearing on this

A broad exclusion is permissible so long as it is not

ambiguous.

The exclusionary language in question has been

uniformly upheld as non-ambiguous by the courts.

In addi-

tion, all courts which have considered the issue have uniformly held that devices of this type fall within the parameters of the exclusionary language.
DATED this

23~d

day of September, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ByE~'{~
Bruce H. Jensen
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Off ice Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for
Defendant-Appellant
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the 24th day of September, 1982.
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